European defense budgets are continuing to rise. Where does that leave us?

In recent years, Europe has seen a lot of change concerning national budgets of defense. One can see this either as a reemergence of the European superpower or a renaissance of doubt in light of a looming threat coming from the east, and an erratic geopolitical tie in the west. On average, European defense budgets have risen by 63% (1) in the last five years, and to understand this rise, one must first consider the history of national defense in post-ww2 Europe.

After the end of World War Two, Europe rapidly demilitarized, then rearmed under U.S. protection. From 1949 onward, security and defense was outsourced to the U.S., via NATO. The Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Plan, first proposed by the U.S. secretary of state George Marshall, included a transfer of $13.3 billion (equivalent to $137 billion (2) in 2025 (3)) to aid the economic recovery of the European states. The Marshall plan first solidified the European idea of dependence on the U.S. - by helping recover and rebuild European economic potential and power, the U.S. made a conscious effort to secure its alliance with Europe, that has lasted up until today, even though it is currently fluctuating.

During the early years of the cold war, western European defense spending rose rapidly. The military alliance known as the Warsaw Pact Organization (4) impacted western budgets insofar as it raised the NATO states' awareness to a looming threat of active war in Europe. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were polar opposites, both afraid of a loss of identity. One side defended the east, the other tried to keep peace in the west (5). Meanwhile, as the cold war subtly unrolled, western insecurity rose and the public grew apprehensive to demilitarization.

After the Cold War ended, European defense budgets fell once again. Attention towards social programs and welfare rose quickly and integration became an integral part of the European democracies. The end of the war also marked sharp cuts in armies and procurement, leading to a stark need for resupply in the early 2010s. Before 2014, Europe had experienced an elongated time of peace and prosperity.

After Russia's initial attack of crimea, the "Soviet" threat rose anew. Even though Russia itself is a single-standing country today, one could consider the same idealistic problems as before. West has fought east for a long time and ideals of the two have fluctuated, though never quite correlated or intertwined. Russia is as of today a dictatorship, advocating for the reestablishment of the Soviet Union. Some consider the invasion of Ukraine to be only the first part of Putin's plan. Before 2014, Europe had experienced an elongated time of peace and prosperity. This eventually led to less emphasis on defense. After the Crimean invasion, we were confronted with a new-old threat and are now struggling to keep defense budgets up. Both Moldova and Romania are afraid of being "the next", or the following step after Ukraine in Russia's plan. And even though a union of the two could benefit national safety and defense, Romania and Moldova are still hesitant as to the option being considerable. (7). This can then be lead back to our initial issue of identity, and states losing identity in cases of either a lack in defense or a threat of unification.

Finally, some feel as though peace between the western nations and Russia will never be a viable, or feasible option. Russia's full scale war in Ukraine has transformed perceptions of threat and has motivated jumps in defense budgets across Europe. Germany has for example started a historic rearmament drive (8), that could be lead back to a possible fear of a Russian interest in the former DDR, which today consists of eastern Germany.

It is thus not possible to appease and please all sides. Pacifists wish for peace without rearmament, defense advocates desire a safety net like a nuclear arsenal or at least anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems across Europe. It is not possible either to create a perfectly functioning system in an imperfect world. The U.S. is facing a nationwide threat of emergent fascism, France and Germany are actively fighting the far right and the whole of eastern Europe is most afraid of all, of the Russian threat. it is therefore important to consider defense as a fluctuating element of civilizations. Times of peace cause less intensive spending, and when times of war do arrive, those budgets will start of low, but will rapidly rise.

SOURCES:

(1) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-defence-readiness/

(2)Frankenfeld, Peter (2012). "A Marshall Plan for Greece? The European Union and the Financial Crisis in Greece. A Theoretical and Political Analysis in the Global World Against a Background of Regional Integration: Table 1. European Recovery Programme – Marshall Plan ($ million)". Prace i Materiały Instytutu Handlu Zagranicznego Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego (31/1): 69. ISSN 2300-6153.

(3) 1634–1699: McCusker, J. J. (1997). How Much Is That in Real Money? A Historical Price Index for Use as a Deflator of Money Values in the Economy of the United States: Addenda et Corrigenda (PDF). American Antiquarian Society. 1700–1799: McCusker, J. J. (1992). How Much Is That in Real Money? A Historical Price Index for Use as a Deflator of Money Values in the Economy of the United States (PDF). American Antiquarian Society. 1800–present: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. "Consumer Price Index (estimate) 1800–". Retrieved February 29, 2024.

(4) 'NATO Summit (Brussels)', column 1,289, volume 128, series 6, Hansard

(5) Page 22, 'NATO and OSCE, Partners or Rivals?', Edward Killham

(6) "The Cold War, the Long Peace, and the Future," Diplomatic History, 16/2, (1992): p 235.

(7) https://cepa.org/article/a-romania-moldova-union-work-has-begun/

(8) https://www.dw.com/de/milliarden-f%C3%BCrs-milit%C3%A4r-die-einkaufsliste-der-bundeswehr/a-75706494